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Abstract
In a recent article, Mario Attie-Picker maintains that a number of experimental studies
provide evidence against Sextus Empiricus’s empirical claims about both the connection
between belief and anxiety and the connection between suspension of judgement and
undisturbedness. In this article, I argue that Sextus escapes unharmed from the challenge
raised by the studies in question for the simple reason that he does not make the claims
ascribed to him. In other words, I argue that Attie-Picker is attacking a straw man.
Résumé
Dans un article récent, Mario Attie-Picker soutient que plusieurs études expérimentales
produisent des preuves contre les affirmations empiriques établies par Sextus Empiricus
sur les liens entre, d’une part, la croyance et l’anxiété et, d’autre part, la suspension du
jugement et l’imperturbabilité. Dans cet article, je défends l’idée que Sextus sort indemne
des objections soulevées par les études en question pour la simple raison qu’il ne fait pas
les affirmations qui lui sont attribuées. En d’autres termes, je soutiens qu’Attie-Picker atta-
que une position qui lui sert d’épouvantail.
Keywords: experimental philosophy; Pyrrhonism; suspension; undisturbedness; evaluative belief; assertion;
dogmatism
1. Introduction
A Pyrrhonist may find in experimental philosophy grist for his sceptical mill inas-
much as experimental studies that examine people’s intuitions about thought exper-
iments reveal that there is disagreement between the intuitions of philosophers and
those of laypersons, or between the intuitions of the members of different cultural,
linguistic, and socio-economic groups. Since the Pyrrhonist finds himself unable to
resolve such disagreements, he feels compelled to suspend judgement about the mat-
ters under dispute. He likewise suspends judgement in the face of the metaphilosoph-
ical disagreement between experimental and armchair philosophers about the correct
method of philosophical inquiry because thus far he has been incapable of finding a
non-question-begging way of adjudicating that disagreement. Despite his suspending
judgement about this second-order dispute, it is perhaps legitimate to presume that it
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would be unwelcome news for the Pyrrhonist if experimental research provided
strong evidence against the claims on which his sceptical stance is (allegedly)
based. In a recent article, Mario Attie-Picker (2020) purports to show, on the basis
of a number of experimental studies, that Sextus Empiricus’s claims about both the
connection between belief and anxiety and the connection between suspension
(ἐποχή) and undisturbedness (ἀταραξία) are mistaken.1 In this article, I jump to
Sextus’s defence and argue that Attie-Picker’s attempt at refuting Pyrrhonism fails
because he drastically misrepresents this brand of scepticism.2 In other words, I
think that Attie-Picker is attacking a straw man. My motivation in offering the pre-
sent reply on behalf of Sextus is not (or not merely) an interest in textual exegesis or
the historiography of philosophy, but (mainly) an interest in providing an accurate
picture of Pyrrhonism understood as a live philosophical option.
In Section 2, I offer a description of the Pyrrhonist’s philosophical journey from
dogmatism to scepticism for the reader unfamiliar with Sextus’s writings. This pro-
vides the necessary framework for understanding Attie-Picker’s case against
Pyrrhonism and my own case against his interpretation of the sceptical stance. In
Section 3, I present Attie-Picker’s conception of Pyrrhonism and the empirical evi-
dence on the basis of which he purports to show that Sextus got things wrong. In
Section 4, I engage with each one of the beliefs and assertions that Attie-Picker erro-
neously attributes to Sextus, explain the latter’s actual stance on several issues, and
address an objection to my criticism of Attie-Picker’s empirically based argument
against Pyrrhonism. In Section 5, I make some concluding remarks.
2. The Pyrrhonist’s Philosophical Journey
When someone with even a slight familiarity with ancient Pyrrhonism thinks of it,
two notions invariably come to mind, namely, suspension and undisturbedness (tran-
quility, peace of mind). Consider, for instance, Sextus’s definition of scepticism:
The sceptical [approach] is an ability to set up oppositions among things that
appear and things that are thought in any way whatsoever, an ability from
which we come, through the equipollence in the opposed objects and arguments,
first to suspension of judgement and after that to undisturbedness. (PH I 8)3
1 Sextus was an ancient Pyrrhonian philosopher and Empirical doctor who lived sometime between the
late second century and the early third century CE, and whose surviving writings are our main source for
Pyrrhonian scepticism. Two complete works and an important part of a third by Sextus have survived: the
three books of Pyrrhonian Outlines, the five extant books of Against the Dogmatists, and the six books of
Against the Learned. To refer to Pyrrhonian Outlines, I will use the standard abbreviation PH, which are the
initials of the transliterated Greek title, Pyrrhōneioi Hypotypōseis (Πυρρώνειοι Ὑποτυπώσεις). As for the
other two works, they are better known by their Latinized titles of Adversus Dogmaticos and Adversus
Mathematicos, respectively. Although it is absolutely clear that they are two distinct works, in our manu-
scripts, Adversus Dogmaticos is attached to the end of Adversus Mathematicos. This has given rise to a
deeply entrenched practice of using the title Adversus Mathematicos (AM) VII–XI to refer to the five extant
books of Adversus Dogmaticos. Besides the fact that this conventional designation is incorrect, it also creates
confusion among non-specialists. For this reason, to refer to Adversus Dogmaticos, I will use the abbrevi-
ation AD I–V rather than AM VII–XI.
2 I will henceforth use ‘scepticism’ and ‘Pyrrhonism,’ and their cognates, interchangeably.
3 All translations of Sextus’s texts are mine.
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At PH I 10, Sextus defines equipollence or equal strength as “equality in respect of
credibility and lack of credibility, so that none of the conflicting arguments takes pre-
cedence over any other as more credible” (cf. PH I 190, 196, 202); suspension as “a
standstill of the intellect owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything” (cf.
PH I 192, 196); and undisturbedness as “lack of perturbation and calmness of
soul.” Undisturbedness is not only the mental state at which the Pyrrhonist has
arrived after suspending judgement, but the goal that prompted the prospective
Pyrrhonist to engage in philosophical investigation in the first place. Sextus tells us
that the hope of becoming undisturbed is the “causal principle” (i.e., the initial moti-
vation) of the sceptical philosophy (PH I 12), and that up to now the Pyrrhonist’s aim
is both undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection in those
things that are unavoidable (PH I 25, 30; cf. PH I 18, 215, III 235). According to
Sextus’s description of the Pyrrhonist’s philosophical journey (PH I 12, 26, 29; cf.
AM I 6), the prospective Pyrrhonist was disturbed by the disagreements or conflicts
he found among both perceptual and intellectual appearances and was in a state of
aporia regarding which of them he should assent to. For instance, the same object
appeared to him to have conflicting perceptual properties depending on different spa-
tial and quantitative variables, or the same moral view appeared to him to be both
convincing and unconvincing depending on the vantage point from which it was
considered. To remove that state of disturbance, the Pyrrhonist engaged in philosoph-
ical inquiry to determine which appearances are true and which are false. He was
unable to do this, however, owing to the seeming equipollence of the conflicting
appearances, and so he suspended judgement. To his surprise, by suspending judge-
ment, he attained the state of undisturbedness that he was seeking all along — there
being thus a contrast between the way undisturbedness was initially expected to be
attained and the way it finally happened to be attained. Sextus draws here an analogy
between the sceptic and the painter Apelles (PH I 28), who was painting a horse and
trying unsuccessfully to depict the foam around its mouth. In exasperation, he threw
the sponge at the canvas, and to his surprise the imprint of the sponge produced the
desired representation of the foam. Sextus also remarks that undisturbedness has fol-
lowed suspension of judgement fortuitously (PH I 26, 29) and as a shadow follows a
body (PH I 29).
Sextus does not limit himself to reporting that undisturbedness has in fact closely
followed suspension. For in the first and third books of PH, and above all in the fifth
extant book of AD, he also explains why the holding of beliefs about how things really
are prevents one from becoming undisturbed, offering at the same time an account of
how suspension leads to undisturbedness, as well as to happiness.4 His explanation is
focused exclusively on beliefs concerning value: the presence of the things one
believes to be good and of those one believes to be bad produces perturbation. For
when a person lacks what he regards as good, on the one hand, he intensely desires
to obtain it and, on the other, he thinks he is persecuted by things naturally bad and
restlessly tries to escape from them. If he acquires what he considers to be good, he is
4 The idea that, by becoming undisturbed, the sceptic achieves happiness is not found in PH I and III,
but only in AD V. Regardless of their chronological order, perhaps Sextus’s experience at the time he wrote
AD was different from his experience at the time he wrote PH.
Experimental Evidence Against Pyrrhonism 3
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 21 Jun 2021 at 13:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
nonetheless troubled both because he is irrationally and immoderately exalted and
because he is afraid of losing it (PH I 27, III 237, 277; AD V 116–117, 146). For
this reason, even when he is not directly disturbed by the presence of those things
he deems to be bad, he continues to be troubled by his constantly guarding against
them (AD V 117, 129). In addition, those who believe that things are by nature
good or bad are unhappy or can never attain happiness (AD V 111, 113, 118, 130,
144) inasmuch as “all unhappiness occurs because of some disturbance” (AD V
112, cf. 141). Unlike the belief that things are by nature good or bad, suspension
of judgement on the matter makes it possible to attain undisturbedness and happi-
ness (PH I 28, AD V 111, 144, 160; see also PH III 235, AD V 147, 150, 168). For
those who suspend judgement “neither avoid nor pursue anything intensely” (PH I
28). Sextus remarks that undisturbedness supervenes upon suspension of judgement
about all things (PH I 31, 205, AD V 144; cf. AD V 160, 168), which means that the
attainment of undisturbedness has so far occurred only when the sceptic has sus-
pended judgement about all the matters he has investigated — both those that con-
cern values and those that do not.
Despite what Sextus says in some of the passages just referred to, the Pyrrhonist is
not free from all disturbance and hence cannot attain complete happiness, since not
all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit of the things considered to be good and
the intense avoidance of the things considered to be bad. For the Pyrrhonist is dis-
turbed by certain things that impose themselves upon him, such as thirst and hunger
(PH I 29; AD V 143, 148–150, 156–158; cf. PH I 13, 24). Yet he is better off with
regard to these unpleasant affections (πάθη)5 than the dogmatist, since he does not
experience the additional disturbance induced by the belief that such affections are
by nature bad, and it is precisely the absence of that belief that makes them moderate
and more easily borne (PH I 30, III 235–236; AD V 118, 150–155, 161; see also AD V
128–129, 145, 156–160). The existence of those involuntary affections is the reason
that Sextus says that moderation of affection in things unavoidable is, along with
undisturbedness in matters of opinion, the sceptical aim.
3. Attie-Picker’s Conception and Refutation of Pyrrhonism
Attie-Picker opens his article by claiming that Sextus’s Pyrrhonism “presents itself,
like most philosophical schools from the Hellenistic period, as offering advice on
everyday life” (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 97, my italics) inasmuch as Sextus takes his
Pyrrhonism to have significant practical consequences, the most important of
which is that, unlike dogmatism, it makes it possible to attain the state of undisturb-
edness. What does Sextus understand by ‘dogmatism’? For him, a dogmatist is
roughly someone who holds beliefs or makes assertions about how things really are
or about non-evident matters, especially on the basis of what he regards as sound
5 A πάθος is that which happens to someone or something as a result of being affected by an agent in the
broad sense of this term. It refers to the physical and/or psychological state or condition in which the
affected person or thing is. Even though in modern ordinary English ‘affection’ does not have that meaning
anymore, I choose that term to render πάθος for two reasons: not only has ‘affection’ become in the spe-
cialist literature a technical term to translate πάθος, but it also has the advantage of making clear the con-
nection between πάθος and its cognate verb πάσχειν (‘to be affected’).
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arguments and objective evidence. Sextus takes the attitudes of arrogance, rashness,
and self-satisfaction as characteristic of dogmatism (PH I 20, 62, 90, 177, 212, II
21, III 2, 235, 280–281): dogmatists hold fast to their views on p without taking care-
ful account of rival views on p or even despite acknowledging the existence of wide-
spread and entrenched disagreement over p.6 Now, Attie-Picker maintains:
At the core of Sextus’s project is the thesis that belief itself, independently of any
action resulting from it, creates anxiety. As we shall see, the plausibility and suc-
cess of Pyrrhonism depend on the veracity of this claim. The crucial point to
note is that Sextus’s thesis is an empirical claim about human psychology. In
other words, Sextus’s assertion that belief causes anxiety is a claim about our
affective reaction to a specific mental state, namely the state of believing a prop-
osition to be true or false. As an empirical hypothesis it is in principle falsifiable,
and so it is subject to empirical investigation. (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 97, my
italics)
Attie-Picker also remarks that Sextus’s “empirical predictions” (Attie-Picker, 2020,
p. 97, my italics) concerning the relationship between belief and anxiety play a central
role in the rest of his philosophy. He further claims:
The Pyrrhonian project is thus built upon the empirical observation that suspen-
sion of judgment regularly — in fact invariably (“as a shadow follows a body”)
— brings about tranquility. The Apelles story (PH 1.28–9) is presented as the
accidental discovery of this fact about human psychology. Once the Skeptic expe-
riences this process and its result (ataraxia), he devises a system that enables him
to consistently reach the desired mental state. Sextus defines his philosophy as the
continual reenactment of this procedure — the creation of opposing arguments
of equal force — with the explicit end of becoming tranquil (PH 1.8–10).
(Attie-Picker, 2020, pp. 100–101, my italics)
Attie-Picker purports to falsify or rebut the theses, claims, assertions, and predic-
tions he ascribes to Sextus both by appealing to experimental research conducted by
others on the connection between dogmatism and anxiety, and by conducting himself
three experimental studies that examine whether scepticism is conducive to
undisturbedness.
With regard to the psychological studies on the relationship between dogmatism
and anxiety, Attie-Picker first reasonably asks whether what Sextus understands by
‘dogmatism’ is the same as what this term designates in those studies. He concludes
that, although there are important differences, there is enough similarity for the
empirical research he reviews to be relevant to the assessment of the Pyrrhonian
claim that dogmatism causes anxiety. Although I think that his characterization of
the Pyrrhonian conception of dogmatism is incomplete, I agree that the concept of
dogmatism as understood in the research in question is close enough to the concept
6 I should note that this is my, not Attie-Picker’s, characterization of dogmatism as understood by
Sextus.
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of dogmatism as understood by Sextus. Be that as it may, my line of attack in the next
section will focus on Attie-Picker’s characterization of Pyrrhonism.
Attie-Picker remarks that “there seems to be a consensus among psychologists that
dogmatism, and overlapping phenomena like system-justification, serves the psycho-
logical need to cope with anxiety by protecting the person against perceptions of
uncertainty and threat” (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 107), and that while “Sextus presents
his Skepticism as a therapeutic practice capable of alleviating the anxiety resulting
from the beliefs of the Dogmatists,” the “existing research proposes that it is dogma-
tism, as opposed to open-mindedness, that has an anxiety-reducing effect”
(Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 107).
As for the three experimental studies that Attie-Picker conducted, the first study
showed that “higher levels of dogmatism predict lower levels of trait anxiety.
Further, higher scores in Dogmatic moral statements … are also inversely correlated
with anxiety. The results are the exact opposite of Sextus’s claims” (Attie-Picker, 2020,
p. 109). Since the results of the first study were merely correlational, the second study
was designed to examine the causal relation between dogmatism and anxiety.
Attie-Picker points out that, according to Sextus’s “theory on the relationship between
anxiety and belief” (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 111, my italics), “belief in objective moral
values invariably leads to anxiety” (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 112, my italics). Hence, the
idea of the second study
was to test if people who were told “by science” that we know the factors that
determine happiness … would exhibit higher levels of state anxiety than people
who, like the Pyrrhonian, hear that “science” is in a state of suspension — that
we do not know about such factors. The success of the design hinged on whether
participants believed, and internalized, what the article claimed. That is, we
manipulated scientific claims about our current knowledge regarding what is
good, but we hoped to indirectly manipulate the subjects’ certainty about
their own beliefs. The manipulation check suggested that this was indeed the
case. This, however, had absolutely no effect on state anxiety score. The results
thus failed to find any evidence supporting Sextus’s claims. (Attie-Picker, 2020,
pp. 111–112)
The third study tested whether people with stronger moral views are more anxious
than people who express less certainty in their moral views. The results failed to sup-
port Sextus’s hypothesis that moral belief causes anxiety. Attie-Picker remarks that
the results of the three studies “did not provide any evidence for Sextus’s anxiety
claim. … While the results are far from conclusive, they strongly suggest that the rela-
tionship between dogmatism and anxiety is the opposite of what Sextus claimed”
(Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 118).
Attie-Picker considers two objections to his three studies. The first is that all the
participants in those studies retain some belief about what is good, which means
that according to Sextus they will not be able to attain undisturbedness inasmuch
this state of mind follows from total suspension of judgement. In reply,
Attie-Picker observes that the objection in question “entails the view that tranquility
cannot increase incrementally as the would-be Skeptic (or anyone else) loses the
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appropriate beliefs,” whereas Sextus “explicitly endorses the idea that tranquility fol-
lows from gradual changes in belief” (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 119). He adds:
Presumably, the first time the Skeptic suspends judgment, she does not suspend
judgment about everything. Rather, just as Apelles was painting a particular
painting (a horse), the Skeptic was investigating a particular problem. When
she suspends judgment about that problem, Sextus tells us, she discovers that
suspension is followed by tranquility. She then proceeds to apply the
Pyrrhonian method to all problems. The whole project would not have been
possible if the initial discovery had not produced tranquility. Thus, it is not nec-
essary to suspend judgment about everything to obtain the benefit of abandon-
ing some beliefs. This is especially clear in the last chapter of the Outlines. Sextus
writes, “Sceptics are philanthropic and wish to cure by argument, as far as they
can, the conceit and rashness of the Dogmatists” (PH 3.280, emphasis mine).
(Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 119)
The second objection is that the participants in the second study do not actually
suspend judgement about whether anything is really good, bad, or indifferent inas-
much as they believe that happiness is good but do not know how to obtain it.
Thus, the participants do not “become more skeptical with respect to the belief
that really matters, i.e., that happiness is good. A Pyrrhonist, Sextus might say,
becomes tranquil not merely by suspending judgment about what brings about hap-
piness, but rather by suspending judgment about the value of happiness itself”
(Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 120). In reply, Attie-Picker remarks:
there is an important way in which the Skeptic’s situation parallels that of the
participants: just as the latter do not question the belief that happiness is
good, the Skeptic never questions the claim that tranquility is the goal of
human life. Consider what would happen if Sextus suspended judgment about
whether tranquility is the end. What reason would he then have to keep devising
a contrary account to every account? Questioning that “for the sake of which
everything is done or considered” (PH 1.25) puts into question the very purpose
of being a Skeptic.
… Therefore, just like the participants, the Skeptic does not suspend judg-
ment about the goal (happiness for the former, tranquility for the latter). In
both cases, the goal is fixed. Thus, in an important sense, the fact (if it is a
fact) that the participants do not suspend judgment about whether happiness
is good is not enough to invalidate the results. Furthermore, at key passages
Sextus seems to equate ataraxia with eudaimonia (happiness). … In light of
these passages, it is fair to conclude that the Skeptic, like the participants,
does not question the value of happiness. (Attie-Picker, 2020, pp. 120–121)
I think that, in his refutation of Sextan Pyrrhonism, Attie-Picker is actually arguing
against a straw man because he drastically misrepresents several crucial aspects of that
sceptical stance, as I propose to show in the next section.
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4. Sextus’s Actual Stance
It should first of all be observed that the qualms voiced by Attie-Picker concerning
the plausibility of Sextus’s remarks about both the connection between belief and
anxiety or disturbance and that between suspension and undisturbedness are com-
mon among readers of Sextus. In fact, several specialists in ancient Pyrrhonism
have contested the practical value of both suspension and undisturbedness. For
instance, it has been argued that most theoretical puzzles, difficulties, or disagree-
ments do not cause anxiety but are instead exciting and enthralling (Barnes, 2000,
pp. xxx–xxxi; Mates, 1996, pp. 63, 75–76); that it is unreasonable or ridiculous to
think that suspension can eliminate or mitigate the anxiety a person experiences or
that suspension is a reliable recipe for undisturbedness (Barnes, 2000, p. xxxi; Bett,
2019, p. 172; Mates, 1996, pp. 63, 76–77); that belief in objective values produces a
sense of security, not anxiety (Annas, 1998, pp. 208, 213); that belief about what is
good or bad, or what is true or false, is what gives meaning and sense to one’s life
(Burnyeat, 1997, p. 46); and that it is highly doubtful that the attainment of undis-
turbedness is either desirable or psychologically possible (Striker, 2004, p. 22, 2010,
p. 196). If any of this were true, then the practical value of suspension and undisturb-
edness would be undermined. For in those cases in which unresolved disagreements
do not cause anxiety, there is nothing to be removed through suspension, while in
those cases in which there is indeed anxiety concerning matters of belief, suspension
is useless either because it is not efficacious in removing that anxiety or because it is
impossible to achieve that goal given human beings’ psychological constitution. And
even if it were psychologically possible to attain undisturbedness by suspending
judgement, living an undisturbed life is not appealing or desirable because it
would deprive us of all excitement or all meaning. Although Attie-Picker does not
cite any of the scholarly works just referred to, I take it that he was as astonished
as their authors by Sextus’s remarks about both the connection between belief and
disturbance and the connection between suspension and undisturbedness, the reason
being that these remarks do not correspond to his own experience and the experience
of those with whom he is acquainted. And I take it that it was such astonishment that
led him to undertake experimental studies to put Sextus’s remarks to the test. I have
elsewhere responded to the abovementioned specialists (Machuca, 2006, p. 124,
2019c, pp. 49–51; see also McPherran, 1989, pp. 150, 171). My reply to
Attie-Picker requires somewhat different comments.
As we saw in the previous section, the first thing that Attie-Picker says about
Pyrrhonism is that it offers advice. At least in the present context, the notion of advice
is clearly normative or prescriptive inasmuch as, in offering advice, the Pyrrhonist
recommends that a given course of action (suspending judgement) be undertaken
because it will enable us to attain something that is good, namely, undisturbedness.
Similarly, he recommends that another course of action (holding beliefs) not be
undertaken because it will produce something that is bad, namely, anxiety or disturb-
ance. Thus, the Pyrrhonist claims that suspension should be preferred over the hold-
ing of beliefs because he makes evaluative judgements about the states of
undisturbedness and anxiety, judgements that result in his holding beliefs about
the objective value of those states. Now, the problem with saying that the
8 Dialogue
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 21 Jun 2021 at 13:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
Pyrrhonist offers advice is that he does not make normative claims because he
refrains from making any kind of evaluative judgement. For this reason, it is a flagrant
mistake to say that the Pyrrhonist does not suspend judgement about whether undis-
turbedness and happiness are good or that he does not question their value. If he did
hold beliefs about the value of undisturbedness and happiness, he would be holding
the very same kind of evaluative belief that is held by dogmatists and that has so far
been followed by mental disturbance. Note that this last remark is not to be under-
stood as expressing a belief about the causal connection between belief and disturb-
ance: pace Attie-Picker, the Pyrrhonist refrains from endorsing any theory
whatsoever, and from making any assertion, about whether belief invariably causes
anxiety. He likewise refrains from maintaining that there is a causal relationship
between suspension and undisturbedness, or that the former invariably brings
about the latter. The Pyrrhonist limits himself to reporting on what he has so far
observed and abstains from making any claim that goes beyond the realm of his
own appearances. The image of a shadow following a body (PH I 29) can indeed
be understood as indicating an invariable connection between suspension and undis-
turbedness inasmuch as a shadow always and necessarily follows a body when the
body blocks light. But note that, to compare the way undisturbedness follows the per-
son who suspends judgement with the way a shadow follows a body, Sextus employs
the verb παρακολουθεῖν (PH I 29, also 26), which not merely means ‘to follow,’ but
‘to follow closely.’ By my lights, this indicates that Sextus wants to lay emphasis on the
fact that there is a close connection between suspension and undisturbedness as there
is between a body and its shadow, rather than to express the belief that suspension
invariably causes undisturbedness. More precisely, his intention is to indicate that
at least up to now the Pyrrhonist’s suspension has been closely accompanied by undis-
turbedness (cf. Machuca, 2006, p. 116). In sum, while Attie-Picker’s account of
Sextus’s stance ascribes to the Pyrrhonist a number of beliefs or assertions about
the nature of things or the causal connection between certain mental states, the
Pyrrhonist actually suspends those beliefs and refrains from making those assertions.7
If that is so, then the experimental studies that, according to Attie-Picker, provide evi-
dence that such beliefs and assertions are false or unjustified do nothing to under-
mine the Pyrrhonist’s stance.
With regard to undisturbedness, it should also be observed that, contrary to what
Attie-Picker maintains in his reply to the second of the two objections he considers,
Sextus neither regards the goal of undisturbedness as fixed nor believes that one can-
not question the claim that undisturbedness is the goal of human life. As I have
argued elsewhere (Machuca, 2006, 2020), in four passages Sextus makes it clear
that neither the pursuit nor the attainment of undisturbedness are essential to
Pyrrhonism (PH I 12, 25, 232, and AM I 6). Since this is not the place to examine
7 There is among interpreters a vigorous debate about the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension, namely,
whether it is limited to theoretical or philosophico-scientific beliefs or else encompasses also ordinary or
everyday beliefs (see especially the five essays collected in Burnyeat & Frede, 1997). I side with those
who take Pyrrhonian suspension to be all-embracing. But even if one accepts the view that it is limited
to theoretical beliefs, these are the kind of beliefs that Attie-Picker ascribes to the Pyrrhonist, and so
even those interpreters who defend that view will oppose Attie-Picker’s description of the Pyrrhonian
stance.
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all of these passages, let me briefly focus on one of them. At PH I 25, Sextus tells us:
“We say up to now that the sceptic’s aim is undisturbedness in matters of opinion and
moderation of affection in things unavoidable.” The reason that the sceptic says up to
now that part of his aim is undisturbedness in matters of opinion is that this mental
state has thus far appeared to him to be so, and that he does not rule out the possi-
bility that he might say otherwise in the future because things might appear differ-
ently to him in the future. Up to now, the sceptic has desired to attain
undisturbedness, and so has searched for it, but he does not exclude the possibility
that, in the future, he might pursue a different aim. Sextus is therefore recognizing
that undisturbedness might cease to appear to the sceptic as a state of mind worth
experiencing. If this interpretation is correct, then the sceptic refrains from endorsing
the view that undisturbedness is the fixed goal of human life.
If the Pyrrhonist suspends judgement about the objective value of undisturbedness
and does not consider it to be essential to his stance, then a problem seems to arise: as
Attie-Picker remarks, the Pyrrhonist would lack a reason to (continue to) produce
oppositions between claims or arguments. But this problem is merely apparent.
Note, first, that if the Pyrrhonist’s pursuit of undisturbedness is to be explained as
a mere preference shaped by circumstantial factors such as his socio-cultural milieu
rather than as the result of his believing that it is objectively good, that would be
enough reason for him to continue to produce the above oppositions with the non-
doxastic expectation that what has happened until now might continue to happen in
the future. Second, the Pyrrhonist has an interest in the inquiry into truth that is
independent of his interest in undisturbedness (Machuca, 2011b, pp. 252–253,
2013, Section 2, 2019a, pp. 208–218; Perin, 2010, Chapter 1). His main way of under-
taking his philosophical inquiries is by producing oppositions among claims or argu-
ments with the aim of assessing their epistemic credentials. Thus, even if he
abandoned his desire for undisturbedness, he would still have a reason for producing
such oppositions. It is therefore not the case, pace Attie-Picker, that the sceptic’s
“whole project would not have been possible if the initial discovery had not produced
tranquility” (Attie-Picker, 2020, p. 119).8
The previous remark brings me to Attie-Picker’s reply to the first of the two objec-
tions he considers, a reply that calls for several comments. To begin with, the view
that the attainment of undisturbedness does not require suspending judgement across
the board was already defended by Jonathan Barnes (1990) — whom, incidentally,
Attie-Picker does not cite. According to Barnes: “A man who suffers only mildly
from ταραχή may be a perfect Pyrrhonist; for he may achieve complete ἀταραξία
by exercising his δύναμις and reaching ἐποχή in a very modest way. Others, who
find the whole of life a sea of troubles, will not be set at rest until they have achieved
universal ἐποχή” (Barnes, 1990, p. 2691). Even though as a sceptic Sextus does not
rule out the possibility that others will attain undisturbedness by suspending judge-
ment only about some beliefs, given his past experience it appears to him that
8 As we saw in the previous section, where I cited the longer passage to which this quote belongs,
Attie-Picker states that the discovery in question is that suspension is followed by undisturbedness. But
it is nonsensical to say that the Pyrrhonist becomes undisturbed by discovering that he became undisturbed
after suspending judgement.
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undisturbedness will be attained only when judgement is suspended across the board.
As we saw in Section 2, he explicitly remarks that unperturbedness supervenes upon
suspension of judgement about all things (ἐποχή περὶ πάντων) (PH I 31, 205, AD V
144; cf. AD V 160, 168). I take this to mean that attainment of undisturbedness has at
least thus far occurred only when the Pyrrhonist has suspended judgement about all
the matters into which he has inquired. Of course, all the matters into which he has so
far inquired are not all the matters into which he may inquire. But it is plain that the
sceptic did not become undisturbed the first time he suspended judgement about a
particular problem. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, nowhere does Sextus
explicitly endorse the view that undisturbedness follows from gradual changes in
belief. Why did the sceptic not attain undisturbedness after the first time he sus-
pended judgement about a particular issue? The reason seems to be that he still
held evaluative beliefs— including the belief that discovering the truth about the mat-
ters under investigation is of objective value — and that it is the holding of evaluative
beliefs that is the ultimate source of doxastic disturbance (Machuca, 2019b). If this is
so, then, first, there is indeed a crucial difference between the participants in
Attie-Picker’s experimental studies and the sceptics: whereas the former still hold
evaluative beliefs, the latter hold no evaluative beliefs whatsoever — not even, as
argued above, about undisturbedness and happiness. Second, Sextus should have
said that undisturbedness follows upon suspension about all evaluative matters rather
than about all matters tout court. Let me explain. The sceptic does suspend judge-
ment about all the matters he has so far investigated — both evaluative and
non-evaluative— because the conflicting views on those matters strike him as equally
persuasive or credible. But if my interpretation is on the right track, then the sceptic
could attain undisturbedness if he suspended judgement about all evaluative matters
while holding beliefs about non-evaluative matters. In that case, he would of course
cease to be a sceptic, but he could still become undisturbed (for a detailed discussion
of this issue, see Machuca, 2019b, pp. 207–209, 212).
Given that Attie-Picker mentions PH III 280 in support of his view that the sceptic
attainted undisturbedness after the first time he suspended judgement about a partic-
ular matter, let me say something about this passage. When Sextus remarks that the
sceptical doctor cures his dogmatic patients’ conceit and rashness as far as he can, he
is not referring to the number of beliefs about which he or his patients suspend judge-
ment. Rather, he is expressing the sceptic’s characteristic humility and caution: he
refrains from affirming that his argumentative therapy has worked on every occasion
and from assuring us that it will be efficacious in every, or even any, future patient
afflicted by conceit and rashness. Sextus recognizes that the sceptic’s arguments
have failed, and will perhaps fail, to induce certain people to abandon their beliefs
and suspend judgement; he does not even believe (or disbelieve) that there is always
an argument that is capable of inducing suspension (Machuca, 2009, pp. 107–108,
2019a, pp. 204–205). Now, given Sextus’s caution regarding what might or might
not happen in the future, I disagree both with Attie-Picker’s claim that the sceptic
makes empirical predictions and with his claim that the sceptic has devised a system
that enables him to consistently attain undisturbedness. The sceptic expects that one
event will follow another, but this is merely a non-doxastic expectation that is trig-
gered by the memory of his past experience, in much the same way as the observation
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of smoke, in conjunction with the past observation of smoke and fire together, imme-
diately brings to mind the idea of fire (PH II 101–102, AD II 152, 157).
If my interpretation of Sextus’s Pyrrhonism is on the right track, then he does not
propose any thesis that describes a fact about human psychology that he has acciden-
tally discovered. If he did, then his philosophical inquiries would have enabled him to
find (even if by chance) an important truth. But he explicitly remarks that, while the
dogmatists claim to have discovered the truth about the matters under investigation,
the sceptics continue to inquire because they have not yet found any answers (PH I 1–
3, II 11). Hence, when Sextus talks about the connection between suspension and
undisturbedness as well as that between belief and disturbance, he is not to be inter-
preted as proposing a theory about human psychology, but as providing information
about his own personal experience or as making autobiographical remarks.
It is important to emphasize that, if Sextus made all the sorts of claims or asser-
tions that Attie-Picker ascribes to him, he would be a sitting duck for his dogmatic
rivals, who would at once accuse him of blatant inconsistency: he would be making
the very same sort of claim or assertion about how things really that is the target of
his Pyrrhonian onslaught. Sextus explicitly and repeatedly points out that the sceptic
refrains from making assertions about, e.g., the external objects, the matters under
investigation, or the sceptical phrases, limiting himself instead to reporting on
what appears to him at the moment (e.g., PH I 4, 15, 35, 191, 195–196, 200, 206;
AD II 474). So unless we take Sextus and his fellow Pyrrhonists to be but the most
simple-minded philosophers — despite having devised sophisticated argumentative
weapons that still today are taken to pose serious epistemological challenges that
deserve in-depth analysis — one had better ask oneself if one has not made a
gross mistake in one’s interpretation of their sceptical stance.
I have not attempted to discredit the results of the experimental research con-
ducted by Attie-Picker and others, but only to make the case that the experimental
studies in question do not pose a rebutting defeater for Sextus’s Pyrrhonism for
the simple reason that he does not make the kind of claims or assertions that
Attie-Picker purports to rebut on the basis of those studies.9 It should then be
9 It is worth noting here that the Pyrrhonian sceptic that Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg (2003) have in
mind is also a straw man. They contend that, contrary to what some epistemologists believe, the intuitions
underlying the arguments for Cartesian scepticism are not universal inasmuch as experimental evidence
suggests that “many of the intuitions epistemologists invoke vary with the cultural background, socio-
economic status, and educational background of the person offering the intuition” (Nichols et al., 2003,
p. 227), and that “the appeal of skeptical arguments is culturally local and that this fact justifies a kind
of ‘meta-skepticism’ since it suggests that crucial premises in the arguments for skepticism are not to be
trusted” (Nichols et al., 2003, p. 228). Even though they limit their inquiry to Cartesian scepticism, they
observe that the principles underlying the Pyrrhonist’s Agrippan trilemma too are supported by intuitions,
and that something similar to the argument they put forward against Cartesian scepticism “might at some
later date find a Pyrrhonian target” (Nichols et al., 2003, pp. 246–247 n. 4). It should be noted both that the
Pyrrhonist would not deny that the trilemma works only within a certain conception of knowledge and
justification, and that his arguments are at least to a large extent parasitic on the philosophical doctrines
of those against whom he argues. The trilemma’s reliance on certain epistemological presuppositions
would represent a problem only for those who embrace such presuppositions and who believe that the tri-
lemma poses an insurmountable conundrum for any rational being. By contrast, the Pyrrhonist is not
committed to those theoretical presuppositions or to the soundness of the trilemma (Machuca, 2015,
Section IV).
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clear that the considerations I have made in defence of Sextus are not meant to deny
that most people do not, or would not, find solace in the sceptic’s suspension of
judgement. I myself, despite being sympathetic to Pyrrhonism, find the possibility
of becoming undisturbed by suspending judgement as incompatible with my temper-
ament and life experience. However, this does not lead me to affirm that Sextus’s
remarks about his own and others’ experience are insincere or false, the reason
being that I am extremely cautious about discarding someone’s report on his own
experience because it is entirely different from my own or from that of the people
I know. Whether a person is disturbed by his holding evaluative beliefs or whether
he is able to become undisturbed by suspending judgement seems to depend on
his own psychological makeup and personal history. In fact, there are people who
claim to have found in Pyrrhonism some sort of mental tranquility. A scholar
once told me that the reading of Sextus’s writings prompted the experience of
“being blissful” in much the same way as did the reading of certain Buddhist texts.
Another scholar explained to me that, when he first saw the Ten Oxherding
Pictures from the Buddhist tradition, he was moved in a way he could not put into
words, and that Pyrrhonism later provided him with those words. Moreover, I was
recently contacted by a person who created “The Modern Pyrrhonism Movement”
and who wrote a non-academic book on Pyrrhonism in which he explains how mod-
ern readers can apply the Pyrrhonian practice — which he regards as strikingly sim-
ilar to the Buddhist practice— to everyday life to achieve inner peace. Even though all
these reported practical benefits of Pyrrhonism are entirely foreign to me, I refrain
from affirming that those who claim to enjoy them are disingenuous or confused.
Pyrrhonism may or may not work for you as a means to deal with mental anxiety,
so the only thing you can do, if you are curious enough, is try and see.
Before concluding, let me consider the following objection. At AD V 140, Sextus
remarks that it is possible to avoid disturbance by teaching that nothing is by nature
good or bad, and that since this teaching is peculiar to scepticism, “it belongs to scep-
ticism to procure the happy life.” If Sextus does argue that scepticism is uniquely
suited to achieve the undisturbed and happy life, then evidence about its efficacy
in bringing about such a life is indeed relevant, and it is precisely such evidence
that is provided by the experiments reviewed by Attie-Picker. I will set aside here
the problem posed by the fact that claiming that the sceptic teaches that nothing is
by nature good or bad is at variance with his professed suspension of judgement
because it is not relevant to the purposes of the present article.10 Regarding the ques-
tion of whether scepticism is an efficacious means to attain undisturbedness and hap-
piness, I think that Sextus’s remarks expounded in Section 2 should be understood
both as a non-committal report of his own experience and as a dialectical manoeuvre.
First, it appears to him that up to this point scepticism has made it possible for him
and others to attain undisturbedness, and that becoming undisturbed is central to
being happy. But Sextus does not — and this point is crucial — use his own
10 There is a scholarly debate about whether the sceptical stance expounded in AD V is different from
that expounded in PH (see, e.g., Bett, 1997; Machuca, 2011a). The main point of contention is precisely
whether in AD V the sceptic does not suspend judgement about whether anything is good or bad by nature,
but rather denies that anything is such.
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experience as the basis on which he asserts that scepticism is the only way to secure
an undisturbed and happy life. Second, two of his main dogmatic rivals, namely, the
Stoics and the Epicureans, regarded undisturbedness as the principal component of
happiness, or at least as an important component thereof (Bett, 1997, p. 144;
McPherran, 1989, p. 138; Striker, 1996, pp. 185–188). Sextus may then be putting for-
ward a dialectical argument with the aim of countering his rivals’ arguments to the
effect that only by endorsing certain philosophical tenets can one achieve undisturb-
edness and happiness. In light of these two points, one may say that Sextus does not
actually assert that scepticism is the only efficacious strategy — or at least one effica-
cious strategy — for securing undisturbedness and happiness. It could be argued,
though, that even if we regard Sextus’s remark that Pyrrhonism makes it possible
to lead an undisturbed and happy life as a mere report of his own appearances,
what matters here is not whether he would be refuted by the experimental evidence
presented by Attie-Picker — given that one cannot refute someone who does not
make assertions — but whether we should take his appearances seriously as guides
to the way we should live. Gathering evidence that Sextus’s experience is not repre-
sentative — inasmuch as many do not share it — is relevant in deciding whether
we should follow his way of life. I agree that the experimental evidence in question
might be useful to those who are considering whether the sceptical stance might
help them alleviate the distress they are suffering. But we must bear in mind a
point I made at the beginning of the present section: when reporting on his own
past experience, Sextus is not making normative claims, i.e., he is not telling us
how we should live or that we should follow his way of life. Rather, he is merely issu-
ing autobiographical reports of how he is affected for his readers to consider. For this
reason, providing evidence that others do not think they should adopt the sceptical
approach does not represent a real challenge to him.11
5. Concluding Remarks
It goes without saying that, when attempting to refute a philosopher’s stance, one had
better do one’s best not to distort it. Otherwise, one ends up arguing against a straw
man. In this article, I have argued that this is what happens with Attie-Picker’s
attempt at rebutting Sextus’s remarks about both the connection between belief
and anxiety and the connection between suspension and undisturbedness. For
Sextus does not hold beliefs or make assertions about the objective value of undis-
turbedness and happiness, or about the causal relationship between suspension and
11 The same misunderstanding of Sextus’s stance shown by Attie-Picker is found in Dimech (forthcoming),
who offers reasons against the interpretation of Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. The main reason is Hume’s
critique of the connection between suspension and undisturbedness, a critique that Dimech finds persuasive
and of philosophical value. For Hume shows, according to Dimech, that Sextus’s “view” that across-the-board
suspension is “the unique path to tranquillity” is mistaken inasmuch as such a state of suspension can only lead
to “a miserable existence,” does not have “pleasant psychological effects,” and undermine our “basic psycho-
logical stability.” Incidentally, Dimech also ascribes to Sextus the view that “we can never hold one particular
belief or appearance to be more veridical than not” and the view that the Pyrrhonist shuns or condemns “all
‘philosophical investigations’ into the true natures of things.” However, as noted above, the Pyrrhonist is
engaged in philosophical inquiry into truth and, given his open-mindedness, he does not rule out the possi-
bility of eventually discovering that a given belief or appearance is to be preferred to others as more veridical.
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undisturbedness or between belief and anxiety. Neither does he propose a theory
about the human mind, make predictions about his argumentative therapy, or tell
us how we should live. If Sextus had done any of that, then the results of the exper-
imental studies appealed to by Attie-Picker might be taken to provide a rebutting
defeater for Pyrrhonism. But Sextus only limits himself instead to reporting on his
own, and others’, experience, which seems to be also that of a number of present-day
individuals who have found in the Pyrrhonian stance an efficacious way of coping
with their own anxiety.
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